But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Avuh, why can the seller automatically give the purchaser the fallen house or the dead slave? Let him see which house fell, or which slave died, as according to Rabba bar Avuh, the sale should apply to the house or slave that was the most valuable at the time of the sale.

The Gemara answers: Are you saying that the statement of Rabba bar Avuh applies in the case of a purchaser? A purchaser is different, as there is a principle in the halakhot of commerce that in a case involving a dispute between the seller and the purchaser, the owner of the document of sale, i.e., the purchaser, is at a disadvantage, as a document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible. Therefore, the seller can claim that he has sold the buyer the fallen house or the dead slave.

The Gemara adds: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the objection posed earlier to the statement of Rabba bar Avuh from the statement of Ulla can be rejected easily. Ulla said that if one says to another: I am selling you a house from among my houses, since he did not specify which house he is selling, he can show him an attic [aliyya]. Although this was explained above as referring not to a loft but to the best [me’ula] of his houses, now you may even say that it is referring to a loft, which is the worst of his houses, due to the principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage.

MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem. And if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias in Egypt, he has not fulfilled his obligation. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem, but if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, it is not consecrated as a burnt offering; such a statement does not consecrate the animal at all.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite, then when his term of naziriteship is completed he must shave the hair of his head and bring the requisite offerings in the Temple in Jerusalem; and if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If one says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, he must shave in the Temple in Jerusalem; but if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that one who says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, is not a nazirite at all, as his vow does not take effect.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, and sacrifices it in the temple of Onias, has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: How has he fulfilled his obligation? By sacrificing it in the temple of Onias, hasn’t he merely killed it without sacrificing it properly?

Rav Hamnuna says: The mishna does not mean that he has fulfilled his vow to bring an offering. Rather, he is rendered like one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will not be responsible for it if I kill it beforehand. When the mishna says that he has fulfilled his obligation it simply means that if the animal he consecrated is no longer alive, he does not have to bring another animal in its place.

Rava said to Rav Hamnuna: If that is so, what about the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, he must shave in the Temple in Jerusalem, but if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation? In this case do you also maintain that he is rendered like one who says: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I will not be responsible for bringing its offerings if I kill them beforehand? Such a condition cannot exempt a nazirite from bringing his offerings, because as long as he does not bring his offerings, he is not fit to conclude his term of naziriteship and is still bound by all of the restrictions of a nazirite.

Rather, Rava said there is a different explanation: The animal was never consecrated at all, as this person intended merely to bring the animal as a gift [doron], but not to consecrate it as an offering. He presumably lives closer to the temple of Onias than to the Temple in Jerusalem, and must have said to himself: If it is sufficient to sacrifice this animal in the temple of Onias, I am prepared to exert myself and bring it. But if it is necessary to do more than that, i.e., to bring it to Jerusalem, I am not able to afflict myself. The mishna teaches that although the person never intended to bring the offering to Jerusalem, ideally, he should sacrifice the animal properly, in the Temple in Jerusalem. If he did not bring it there, but sacrificed it in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation, and is not required to bring any other offering in its place.

This is the explanation of the latter clause of the mishna as well: If one said that he would be a nazirite provided that he will shave in the temple of Onias, this man did not intend to accept upon himself the halakhic status of naziriteship. Rather, he merely intends to practice abstinence by not drinking wine, along with observing the other restrictions of a nazirite. Therefore, he said to himself: If it is sufficient to shave in the temple of Onias, I am prepared to exert myself and do so. But if it is necessary to do more than that, i.e., to go to Jerusalem to shave and bring the required offerings, I am not able to afflict myself. The mishna teaches that ideally, he should go to the Temple in Jerusalem to shave and bring all his offerings. If he shaved and brought his offerings in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his vow and has no further obligation.

And Rav Hamnuna could have said to you in response to Rava’s challenge: With regard to the case of one who vowed to become a nazirite on the condition that he would shave and bring his offerings in the temple of Onias, the interpretation of the mishna is as you said. But with regard to one who vows to bring a burnt offering in the temple of Onias, his intent is as I explained, and it is as if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will not be responsible for it if I kill it beforehand.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds in accordance with that which Rav Hamnuna said, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will sacrifice it in the temple of Onias, and he sacrificed it in Eretz Yisrael but not in the Temple, he has fulfilled his obligation, but his actions are also punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet] because he sacrificed an offering outside of the Temple. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna that the animal is consecrated.

This explanation of Rav Hamnuna and Rabbi Yoḥanan is also taught in a baraita: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will sacrifice it in the wilderness of Sinai, thinking that the wilderness of Sinai still has sanctity since the Tabernacle had been located there, and he sacrificed it on the east bank of the Jordan, he has fulfilled his obligation, but his actions are also punishable by karet because he sacrificed an offering outside of the Temple.

MISHNA: The priests who served in the temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say, if they served for something else, a euphemism for idolatry, they are disqualified from service in the Temple. As it is stated: “Nevertheless the priests of the private altars did not come up to the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem, but they did eat matza among their brethren” (II Kings 23:9). The halakhic status of these priests is like that of blemished priests in that they receive a share in the distribution of the meat of the offerings and partake of that meat, but they do not sacrifice offerings or perform any of the sacrificial rites.

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says: With regard to a priest who slaughtered an offering for idol worship and who subsequently repented and came to the Temple in Jerusalem to serve, his offering is acceptable and considered to be an aroma pleasing to the Lord.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the verse from which it is derived? The verse states: “Because they served them before their idols and became a stumbling block of iniquity unto the house of Israel, therefore I have lifted up My hand against them, says the Lord God, and they shall bear their iniquity” (Ezekiel 44:12). And it is written afterward: “And they shall not come near to Me, to serve Me in the priestly role” (Ezekiel 44:13). This indicates that if a priest performed a service for an idol that is considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple, he is disqualified from serving in the Temple, but the slaughter of an offering is not considered service, as it is not considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple and can be performed in the Temple even by a non-priest.

It was stated: If a priest unwittingly performed the sprinkling of the blood of an idolatrous offering and then repented and came to serve in the Temple, Rav Naḥman says that his offering is accepted and is an aroma pleasing to the Lord. Rav Sheshet says: His offering is not a pleasing aroma to the Lord, as he is not fit to serve in the Temple.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say that if a priest sprinkled blood unwittingly for idol worship he cannot serve in the Temple? As it is written: “And they became a stumbling block of iniquity unto the house of Israel.” What, is it not referring to one who served in idol worship either as a stumbling block or as an iniquity? Accordingly, neither may perform the service in the Temple. And the term “stumbling block” is a reference to one who sins unwittingly, and the term “iniquity” is a reference to an intentional sinner. Therefore, even one who unwittingly served in idol worship may not subsequently serve in the Temple.

And Rav Naḥman interprets the verse to mean a stumbling block of iniquity, i.e., only one who serves in idol worship intentionally is disqualified from serving in the Temple, but not one who serves in idol worship unwittingly.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that if a priest sprinkled the blood of an idolatrous offering unwittingly his subsequent offering in the Temple is accepted? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who unwittingly committed idolatry: “And if one person sin through error, then he shall offer a she-goat in its first year for a sin offering. And the priest shall effect atonement for the soul that errs unwittingly, when he sins unwittingly, before the Lord, to effect atonement for him; and he shall be forgiven” (Numbers 15:27–28). The phrase: “For the soul that errs unwittingly” teaches that a priest who sins unwittingly may receive atonement by sacrificing his sin offering on his own.

Rav Naḥman clarifies: In what manner did this priest commit idolatry? If we say he sinned through slaughtering an idolatrous offering, why does the verse indicate specifically that a priest who slaughtered an idolatrous offering unwittingly can bring his own sin offering? This is obvious, as even one who did so intentionally may serve in the Temple after repentance. Rather, is it not referring to a priest who committed idolatry by sprinkling the blood of an idolatrous offering? Accordingly, if he did so unwittingly his subsequent service in the Temple is valid, but if he did so intentionally, he is disqualified from serving in the Temple.

And how does Rav Sheshet interpret that baraita? He could have said to you: Actually, the verse is referring to a case where the priest sinned through slaughtering an idolatrous offering. And although Rav Yehuda said that a priest who slaughtered an idolatrous offering may serve in the Temple after repentance, that statement applies only to one who slaughtered an idolatrous offering unwittingly. But if he did so intentionally, the priest is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Yehuda’s reasoning is that slaughter is not a sacrificial rite in the Temple; but does one who slaughters an idolatrous offering intentionally not become a servant of idol worship?

And Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet follow their respective lines of reasoning, as it was stated that if a priest acted intentionally in the slaughter of an idolatrous offering and subsequently repented, Rav Naḥman says that his offering in the Temple is an aroma pleasing to the Lord, i.e., it is not disqualified, and Rav Sheshet says that his offering in the Temple is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord, i.e., it is disqualified.

Rav Naḥman says that his offering is an aroma pleasing to the Lord, because he did not perform service for an idol that is considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple. And Rav Sheshet says that his offering is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord,