והא דתניא חייב בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות – דימים שבינתיים הויא ידיעה לחלק וקסבר הכא לא הויא ידיעה לחלק דאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור אלא מצטרפין וחייב:
(1) 
וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת (דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין) דְּקָסָבַר אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.
וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת (דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין) דְּקָסָבַר אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.And that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems a person liable if he wrote two letters over two Shabbatot, can also be explained: It is referring to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. In such a situation he deems an individual liable despite the fact that different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, as he holds that although the intervening days are generally considered awareness of his transgression, there is no awareness for a half-measure. Since he performed only half the prohibited labor on the first Shabbat, he is not considered to have become aware of his transgression on the intervening days.
והא דתניא חייב בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות – דאי נמי סבירא לן ימים שבינתים ידיעה הן הכא ליכא למימר דמהני חילוק שבתות לחלק שלא יצטרפו דקסבר אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור.
והא דתניא [וזו ששנויה] שחייב על אות אחת בשבת זו ואות אחת בשבת אחרת — עוסקת בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות (דשבתות כגופין דמיין), שאף על פי שלשיטתו ימים שבין השבתות נחשבים ידיעה לחלק — כאן אין הידיעה זו מחלקת בין שתי השבתות, מפני דקסבר [שהוא סבור]: אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור, וכאילו לא נודע לו בינתיים.
And that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems a person liable if he wrote two letters over two Shabbatot, can also be explained: It is referring to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. In such a situation he deems an individual liable despite the fact that different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, as he holds that although the intervening days are generally considered awareness of his transgression, there is no awareness for a half-measure. Since he performed only half the prohibited labor on the first Shabbat, he is not considered to have become aware of his transgression on the intervening days.
הכל
(2) אֶלָּא לְרָבָא דְּאָמַר ס״ל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לר״ע לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן.
But according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva, and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, holds that separate Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, how can both baraitot be explained?
But according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva, and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, holds that separate Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, how can both baraitot be explained?
אלא לרבא דאמר סבירא ליה לר׳ עקיבא דשבת כגוף אחד הן – דהכי קאמר רבא לעיל ופשט ליה דכי גופין דמיין ולא קביל מיניה אלא סבר כגוף אחד הן:
אלא לשיטת רבא דאמר [שאומר] כי סבירא ליה [סבור] לר׳ עקיבא ששבבוות כגוף אחד הן (ואנו מניחים שרבן גמליאל סבור כמותו),
But according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva, and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, holds that separate Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, how can both baraitot be explained?
הכל
(3) בִּשְׁלָמָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בֵּין בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן וּבֵין בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת דְּקָסָבַר אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.
The Gemara elaborates: Granted, that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot to be liable, is understandable. You can find both a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors, as he holds that Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, and a case where he acted unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. The reason in the second case is that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore the actions on the two Shabbatot are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.
The Gemara elaborates: Granted, that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot to be liable, is understandable. You can find both a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors, as he holds that Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, and a case where he acted unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. The reason in the second case is that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore the actions on the two Shabbatot are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.
בשלמא הא דתניא חייב משכחת לה בין בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות – דהיינו טעמא דחייב דשבתות כגוף אחד הן ובין בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות דימים שבינתיים הוויין ידיעה והכא חייב דאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור ומצטרפין:
בשלמא הא דתניא [נניח לגבי ברייתא זו ששנויה] שאם כתב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות חייב, שכן משכחת לה [מוצא אתה אותה] בין בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות — מפני שלדעתו שבתות כגוף אחד הן, ובין בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות, שאף שהימים שבינתיים נחשבים ידיעה לחלק — כאן אינם מחלקים, מפני דקסבר [שהוא סבור]: אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור.
The Gemara elaborates: Granted, that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot to be liable, is understandable. You can find both a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors, as he holds that Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, and a case where he acted unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. The reason in the second case is that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore the actions on the two Shabbatot are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.
הכל
(4) וְאֶלָּא הָדְתַנְיָא פָּטוּר בְּמַאי מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ לָא בַּחֲדָא וְלָא בַּחֲדָא.
But with regard to that which is taught in the first baraita, that one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot is exempt, in what case can you interpret it, i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does not apply in this case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. And this ruling also does not apply in that case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.
But with regard to that which is taught in the first baraita, that one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot is exempt, in what case can you interpret it, i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does not apply in this case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. And this ruling also does not apply in that case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.
אלא הא דתניא פטור במאי מוקמת לה לא בהדא ולא בהדא – לאו בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות ולאו בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות:
לא בחדא ולא בחדא – בשגגת מלאכות לא מוקמת לה דהא אמר לעיל לר׳ עקיבא לאו כגופין דמיין ומצטרפין ובשגגת שבת נמי לא דאי נמי אמרינן ימים שבינתיים הויין ידיעה לחלק הא שמעינן ליה לר״ג לעיל דאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור דקתני בשתי העלמות ר״ג מחייב.
ואלא הדתניא [זו ששנויה] שפטור, במאי מוקמת לה [במה הוא מעמיד אותה]? לא בחדא ולא בחדא [לא בזו ולא בזו], לא בשגגת מלאכות — שהרי לשיטת ר׳ עקיבא, שרבן גמליאל סבור כמותו, השבתות כגוף אחד הן, ולא בשגגת שבת — שהרי לשיטת רבן גמליאל אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור, ואינה מחלקת!
But with regard to that which is taught in the first baraita, that one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot is exempt, in what case can you interpret it, i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does not apply in this case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. And this ruling also does not apply in that case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.
הכל
(5) אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ס״ל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כר׳ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמַר שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין.
The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.
The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.
אמר לך רבא – מהכא לא מצית יליף דאמינא רבן גמליאל דפטור כר׳ אליעזר סבירא ליה דאמר במתניתין שבתות כגופין דמיין הילכך לא מצטרפי שבתות. ולא סבירא ליה כר׳ עקיבא:
ומשיבים, אמר [יכול לומר] לך רבא: רבן גמליאל סבירא ליה [סבור] כר׳ אליעזר, שאמר: לענין שגגת מלאכות שבתות כגופין נפרדים דמיין [נחשבות], ולכן אין האותיות שבשתי השבתות מצטרפות, ופטור.
The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.
הכל
(6) וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי אַאַחְרָנְיָיתָא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא כר׳ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא ס״ל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ הַיְינוּ דִּפְלִיגִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.
The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the baraita teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another halakha. Granted, if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, this is referring to the fact that they disagree in the other baraita with regard to the case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore he is liable.
The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the baraita teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another halakha. Granted, if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, this is referring to the fact that they disagree in the other baraita with regard to the case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore he is liable.
והא מדקתני הכא ומודי רבן גמליאל [מכלל] דפליגי באוחרניתא. רבן גמליאל וחכמים:
אי אמרת בשלמא – האי ומודה רבן גמליאל לחכמים דהיינו חכמים היינו רבי עקיבא דרבן גמליאל כר׳ עקיבא סבירא ליה:
היינו דפליגי – באוחרניתא בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות דימים שבינתים הויין ידיעה לחלק:
דרבן גמליאל סבר אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור – וחייב:
ור׳ עקיבא סבר כו׳:
א״א בשלמא כר״ע ס״ל – דאית ליה לר״ע נמי שבתות כגופין דמיין והא דקתני מודה לר״ע הוא דמודה היינו דפליגי בהכותב אות אחת בשבת זו ואות אחת בשבת זו בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות דר׳ גמליאל מחייב כאידך ברייתא דאין ידיעת ימים שבינתים מועלת לחצי שיעור ור׳ עקיבא היינו חכמים דפטרי סבר יש ידיעה.
ומקשים, והא מדקתני [והרי ממה שהוא שונה] בברייתא זו: ומודה רבן גמליאל לחכמים שאם כתב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות שהוא פטור, מכלל הדברים אתה למד דפליגי אאחרנייתא [שהוא וחכמים חולקים בהלכה אחרת] שבענין זה. ומעתה, אי אמרת בשלמא [נניח אם אתה אומר] שרבן גמליאל כר׳ עקיבא סבירא ליה [סבור הוא], וכן אתה מניח שדעת חכמים היא דעת ר׳ עקיבא — היינו דפליגי [זהו שהם חולקים] בברייתא השניה בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות, שרבן גמליאל סבר [סבור]: למרות שימים שבינתיים נחשבים ידיעה לחלק — אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור, ולכן חייב,
The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the baraita teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another halakha. Granted, if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, this is referring to the fact that they disagree in the other baraita with regard to the case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore he is liable.
הכל
(7) וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר אַלְמָא שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כר׳ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר ס״ל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי בְּמַאי.
And Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, that he is exempt. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore the letters written on different Shabbatot do not combine, which is why he is exempt. But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and from the fact that one baraita states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another similar halakha, this raises the question: About what case do they disagree?
And Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, that he is exempt. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore the letters written on different Shabbatot do not combine, which is why he is exempt. But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and from the fact that one baraita states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another similar halakha, this raises the question: About what case do they disagree?
ומודה רבן גמליאל לר׳ עקיבא בזדון שבת כו׳ – אלא אי אמרת רבן גמליאל כר׳ אליעזר סבירא ליה. דר׳ אליעזר היינו חכמים דקאמר ומודה להו רבן גמליאל מכלל דפליגי באוחרניתא במאי פליגי:
אלא אי אמרת כר״א ס״ל – בשגגת מלאכות וזדון שבת דהאי דקתני ומודה לר״א קאמר על כרחיך מכלל דפליגי במקצת.
ומכל מקום מודה רבן גמליאל לר׳ עקיבא בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות שהוא פטור, אלמא [מכאן] שלדעת ר׳ עקיבא שבתות כגופין נפרדים דמיין [נחשבות], ולכן אין האותיות שבשתי השבתות מצטרפות. אלא אי אמרת [אם אומר אתה] כי רבן גמליאל כר׳ אליעזר סבירא ליה [סבור הוא], וממה שנאמר ״ומודה רבן גמליאל שפטור״, מכלל הדברים אתה למד דפליגי [שחלוקים] הם בהלכה אחרת דומה לזו, יש לשאול: במאי [במה] הם חולקים, שרבן גמליאל מחייב ור׳ אליעזר פוטר?
And Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, that he is exempt. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore the letters written on different Shabbatot do not combine, which is why he is exempt. But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and from the fact that one baraita states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another similar halakha, this raises the question: About what case do they disagree?
הכל
(8) אִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ס״ל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּאֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר דְּתַנְיָא הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת אוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ וְאוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ ר׳ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב.
If you suggest that they disagree with regard to a case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, then that cannot be correct. After all, even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who writes two letters on two separate Shabbatot, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable.
If you suggest that they disagree with regard to a case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, then that cannot be correct. After all, even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who writes two letters on two separate Shabbatot, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable.
אי בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכה – דימים שבינתים הוויין ידיעה לחלק ורבן גמליאל דמחייב דקא סבר אין ידיעה לחצי שיעור בהא אפי׳ ר׳ אליעזר כרבן גמליאל סבירא ליה דאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור:
דתניא הכותב ב׳ אותיות כו׳ – ר׳ אליעזר מחייב ואלא באחד על האריג פליג ר׳ אליעזר (נמי). היינו נמי חצי שיעור בהא נמי חייובי מחייב ר׳ אליעזר:
ר״א מחייב – ודאי בשגגת שבת קאמר ומש״ה קתני דאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור דאי בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הא כולי עלמא מודו דלר״א שבתות כגופין דמיין ופטור.
אי [אם] בשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות — אפילו ר׳ אליעזר כרבן גמליאל סבירא ליה [סבור] שאין ידיעה לחצי שיעור, דתניא [ששנויה ברייתא]: הכותב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות, אות אחת בשבת זו ואות אחת בשבת זו — ר׳ אליעזר מחייב!
If you suggest that they disagree with regard to a case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, then that cannot be correct. After all, even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who writes two letters on two separate Shabbatot, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable.
הכל
(9) וְאֶלָּא בְּאַחַת עַל הָאָרִיג חַיּוֹבֵי מְחַיֵּיב דִּתְנַן ר״א רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר אהָאוֹרֵג שְׁלֹשָׁה חוּטִין בַּתְּחִלָּה וְאֶחָד עַל הָאָרִיג חַיָּיב.
But rather, you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement with regard to adding one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable in the case of adding a single thread, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning of a new fabric, or adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric, is liable.
But rather, you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement with regard to adding one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable in the case of adding a single thread, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning of a new fabric, or adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric, is liable.
דתנן ר׳ אליעזר אומר האורג כו׳ – אלא ודאי כר׳ עקיבא סבירא ליה. אמר רבא לעולם כר׳ אליעזר סבירא ליה ומכלל דפליגי בהדא:
אלא באחת על האריג – פליגי ר׳ גמליאל ור״א והכי קאמר מודה ר״ג לר״א בכותב אות אחת כו׳ זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכה שהוא פטור דשבתות כגופין דמיין ואף על גב דפליג עליה באחת על האריג דהתם מחייב ר׳ גמליאל אע״ג דדמי להאי דכותב חצי שיעור בשבת שני ומשלים לשיעור הראשון ואורג נמי חצי שיעור על האריג אפילו הכי מחייב ר״ג דהכא היינו טעמא דשבתות כגופין דמיין ולא מצטרפין דדמי כחורש חצי שיעור וזורע חצי שיעור אבל באורג דמעיקרא הוי בהאי בגד אריג שיעור הרבה חשיב האי חוט שארג זה אגב כל הבגד ואף על גב דת״ק דר׳ גמליאל דפליג עליה באין ידיעה לחצי שיעור לאו ר״א הוא אפילו הכי האי ומודה דקתני אדר״א קאי ואפלוגתא דאחת על האריג והא דקתני ליה הכא גבי העלמות איידי דאיירי בכותב לחצאים הא ר״א נמי חיובי מחייב.
ואלא תאמר ש״ומודה רבן גמליאל״ מתייחס להלכה אחרת שנחלקו בה, באחת על האריג, ששיעור איסור אריגה הוא כשאורג שלושה חוטים, ואולם אם הוסיף אפילו חוט אחד על אריג קיים — רבן גמליאל מחייב ור׳ אליעזר פוטר. ועל כן נאמר בברייתא כי במקרה דומה לזה בכתיבה, שהוסיף אות לאות שנכתבה בשבת קודמת, מודה רבן גמליאל שהוא פטור — אין לומר כן, שהרי גם ר׳ אליעזר חיובי מחייב בהלכה זו, דתנן [ששנינו במשנה], ר׳ אליעזר אומר: האורג שלשה חוטין בתחלה, ואחד על האריג — חייב!
But rather, you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement with regard to adding one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable in the case of adding a single thread, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning of a new fabric, or adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric, is liable.
הכל
(10) אָמַר רָבָא מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג בַּחֲדָא דְּתַנְיָא הוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת בְּהֶעְלֵם אַחַת חַיָּיב בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת פָּטוּר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר בבְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד בִּרְשׁוּת אֶחָד חַיָּיב בִּשְׁתֵּי רְשׁוּיוֹת פָּטוּר.
Rava said: When it was derived by inference that Rabban Gamliel disagrees about one other halakha, that disagreement is referring to the following case, as it is taught in a baraita: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and then carried out another half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness, is liable; if he carried them out in two lapses of awareness he is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where this occurred in one lapse of awareness, if they were both carried to one public domain he is liable; but if they were carried to two public domains that are separated from each other he is exempt.
Rava said: When it was derived by inference that Rabban Gamliel disagrees about one other halakha, that disagreement is referring to the following case, as it is taught in a baraita: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and then carried out another half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness, is liable; if he carried them out in two lapses of awareness he is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where this occurred in one lapse of awareness, if they were both carried to one public domain he is liable; but if they were carried to two public domains that are separated from each other he is exempt.
דתנן הוציא חצי גרוגרות וחזר והוציא חצי גרוגרות בהעלם אחד חייב – דמצטרפין:
בב׳ העלמות – פטור:
ר׳ יוסי אומר בהעלם אחד אם לרשות אחת הוציאן חייב – דמצטרפין לשתי רשויות אין מצטרפין ופטור דרבן גמליאל מחמיר כתנא קמא והכי קסבר בהעלם אחד חייב אע״ג דהוציאן לשתי רשויות. ור׳ אליעזר סבר לה כר׳ יוסי דאם הוציאן לשתי רשויות אע״ג דבהעלם אחד פטור. ובהדא פליגי. בהידין מסתברא כרבא אי כרב חסדא:
אמר רבא – לעולם ומודה דקתני לר״א מודה ואהך פלוגתא קאי דפליגי בהדא.
בשתי העלמות פטור – ויש ידיעה לחצי שיעור.
לשתי רשויות – ושתיהן רה״ר פטור דרשויות מחלקות. ברייתא דלעיל מודה ר׳ גמליאל לר״א דשבתות כגופין דמיין דמחלקין לכתיבת שתי אותיות מלצרף אבל בהא פליג עליה דרשויות לא מחלקות.
אמר רבא: מה שנאמר ״ומודה רבן גמליאל״, כוונתו — מכלל דפליג בחדא דתניא [שהוא חולק בזו ששנויה בברייתא]: הוציא חצי גרוגרת לרשות הרבים וחזר והוציא חצי גרוגרת, בהעלם אחת — חייב, בשתי העלמות — פטור. ר׳ יוסי אומר: למרות שהיה זה בהעלם אחד, אם היה זה ברשות אחד, שהוציא לאותה רשות הרבים — חייב, בשתי רשויות כלומר, לשתי רשויות רבים שמופרדות זו מזו — פטור;
Rava said: When it was derived by inference that Rabban Gamliel disagrees about one other halakha, that disagreement is referring to the following case, as it is taught in a baraita: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and then carried out another half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness, is liable; if he carried them out in two lapses of awareness he is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where this occurred in one lapse of awareness, if they were both carried to one public domain he is liable; but if they were carried to two public domains that are separated from each other he is exempt.
הכל
(11) דר׳ דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כת״ק כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא ור׳ וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
As in such a case, Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another baraita then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual Shabbatot are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different Shabbatot is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.
As in such a case, Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another baraita then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual Shabbatot are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different Shabbatot is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.
ר״ג כתנא קמא – וקשה דמאי קאמר כת״ק דלר״ג העלמות אינן מחלקות שהרי כפשטה לא מצינו למימר דהא ת״ק קאמר בשתי העלמות פטור.
שרבן גמליאל סבור כתנא קמא [הראשון], שרשויות אינן מחלקות וחייב, ור׳ אליעזר סבור כר׳ יוסי שרשויות מחלקות. ועל כך נאמר כי אף שרבן גמליאל חולק על ר׳ אליעזר בענין רשויות, וסבור שאינן מחלקות, הריהו מודה לו ששבתות הן גופים מחולקים, ואם כתב שתי אותיות בשתי שבתות — פטור.
As in such a case, Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another baraita then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual Shabbatot are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different Shabbatot is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.
הכל
(12) ת״ש תָּא שְׁמַע אָמַר לוֹ חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מק״ו מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר וּמָה נִדָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference. Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference. Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?
ומציעים, תא שמע [בוא ושמע] ראיה לשיטת רב חסדא ממה ששנינו במשנתנו, אמר לו ר׳ אליעזר לר׳ עקיבא: חייב על כל אחת ואחת מקל וחומר, ומה נדה שאין בה תוצאות הרבה וחטאות הרבה חייב על כל אחת ואחת, שבת שיש בה תוצאות הרבה וחטאות הרבה — אינו דין שחייב על כל אחת ואחת.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference. Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?
הכל
(13) [כו׳] בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אוֹ לָא הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ וּמָה נִדָּה.
Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited labors, and the basis of the dilemma was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, that is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.
Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited labors, and the basis of the dilemma was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, that is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.
בשלמא לרב חסדא דאמר שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכה – דליכא חילוק מלאכות ובעא מיניה דימים שבינתים מי הוויין ידיעה לחלק אי לא:
היינו דקאמר ליה ומה נדה – דהתם בנדה נמי ימים שבינתים הוויין ידיעה לחלק כדמפרש לקמן:
בשלמא [נניח] לשיטת רב חסדא דאמר [שאומר]: שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות בעי מיניה [שאל אותו], ולענין ימים שבינתים מי הויין [האם הם נחשבים] ידיעה לחלק בין השבתות או לא — היינו דקאמר ליה [זהו שאומר לו] ר׳ אליעזר: ״ומה נדה״ בלשון יחיד, שכשם שבאשה חייב על כל ביאה בגלל הימים שבינתיים — כך בשבת נחשבים הימים שבינתיים ידיעה לחלק.
Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited labors, and the basis of the dilemma was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, that is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.
הכל
(14) אֶלָּא לְרָבָא דְּאָמַר זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת אִי כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא לִיתְנֵי נִדּוֹת.
But according to Rava, who says it was in reference to a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the basis of the dilemma was whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, let Rabbi Eliezer teach this halakha with the plural phrase: Menstruating women. This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to Shabbatot, which are also separate entities.
But according to Rava, who says it was in reference to a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the basis of the dilemma was whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, let Rabbi Eliezer teach this halakha with the plural phrase: Menstruating women. This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to Shabbatot, which are also separate entities.
אלא לרבא כו׳ – דאי כגופין דמיין אי לא בעא מיניה וקא אמר ליה ומה נדה היינו גוף אחד א״כ ומה נדות איבעי ליה למיתנא דנדות הוו גופין מוחלקין:
אלא לרבא דאמר [שאומר]: זדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה [ששאל אותו], ולענין שבתות אי כגופין נפרדים דמיין [נחשבות] ואי לא [או לא] — ליתני [שישנה] ״נדות״, בלשון רבים, שכשם שהבא על חמש נשים נדות, שהן גופים מחולקים — חייב על כל אחת ואחת, כך העושה מלאכה בשבתות הרבה בשגגת שבת — חייב על כל אחת ואחת, מפני שהן גופים מחולקים!
But according to Rava, who says it was in reference to a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the basis of the dilemma was whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, let Rabbi Eliezer teach this halakha with the plural phrase: Menstruating women. This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to Shabbatot, which are also separate entities.
הכל
(15) אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא תְּנִי נִדּוֹת שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנֵי נִדָּה רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה תָּנֵי נִדָּה רַב נָתָן בַּר אוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר תָּנֵי נִדּוֹת.
The Gemara responds that Rava could say to you: Indeed, teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women. The Gemara notes that Shmuel teaches the mishna with the singular term menstruating woman, and Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches the mishna with the term menstruating woman; but Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women.
The Gemara responds that Rava could say to you: Indeed, teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women. The Gemara notes that Shmuel teaches the mishna with the singular term menstruating woman, and Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches the mishna with the term menstruating woman; but Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women.
תני נדות – מה נדות שאין בהן תוצאות הרבה הבא על חמש נשים נדות חייב על כל אחת ואחת כו׳ דגופין נינהו שבתות לא כ״ש שהן גופין.
שמואל תני נדה – דס״ל כרב חסדא.
ומתרצים, אמר [יכול לומר] לך רבא: תני [שנה] ״נדות״. ומעירים, שמואל תני [היה שונה] ״נדה״, וכן רב אדא בר אהבה תני [היה שונה] ״נדה״. רב נתן בר אושעיא אמר: תני [שנה] ״נדות״.
The Gemara responds that Rava could say to you: Indeed, teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women. The Gemara notes that Shmuel teaches the mishna with the singular term menstruating woman, and Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches the mishna with the term menstruating woman; but Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women.
הכל
(16) וּלְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק וְאִי לָא נִדָּה מַאי יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אִית בַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was in reference to a case where he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the question was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her that can be considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?
The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was in reference to a case where he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the question was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her that can be considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?
ולרב חסדא – נדה מאי ימים שבינתים הוויין ידיעה לחלק אית ליה. אמר רבא כגון שבא עליה וטבלה כו׳. דבטבילות הוויין כימים שבנתים לחלק על כל ביאה וביאה:
ושואלים, ולרב חסדא דאמר [שאומר]: שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות הוא דבעי מיניה [ששאל אותו], ולענין ימים שבינתים מי הויין [האם הם נחשבים] ידיעה לחלק בין השבתות ואי לא [או לא], נדה מאי [מה, כיצד] ימים שבינתים הויין [הריהם נחשבים] ידיעה לחלק אית [יש] בה?
The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was in reference to a case where he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the question was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her that can be considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?
הכל
(17) אָמַר רָבָא גכְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ וְטָבְלָה וְרָאֲתָה וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ וְטָבְלָה וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ דִּטְבִילוֹת הָוְיָין כְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם.
Rava said: This is possible in a case where he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with her while she was menstruating, and then she immersed in a ritual bath and became pure, and then she saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and then she immersed and then saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As here the immersions which purify her are considered like intervening days.
Rava said: This is possible in a case where he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with her while she was menstruating, and then she immersed in a ritual bath and became pure, and then she saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and then she immersed and then saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As here the immersions which purify her are considered like intervening days.
אמר רבא: כגון שבא עליה בנדתה בשוגג וטבלה, וראתה דם וחזר ובא עליה בשוגג, וטבלה, ושוב ראתה וחזר ובא עליה, שטבילות שנטהרה בהן הויין [הריהן] כימים שבינתים.
Rava said: This is possible in a case where he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with her while she was menstruating, and then she immersed in a ritual bath and became pure, and then she saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and then she immersed and then saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As here the immersions which purify her are considered like intervening days.
הכל
(18) ת״ש תָּא שְׁמַע הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא הַיְינוּ דְקָתָנֵי קְטַנּוֹת.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid. Granted, according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether Shabbatot are considered separate entities, this is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer teaches his resolution by using the plural term minor girls, to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different Shabbatot.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid. Granted, according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether Shabbatot are considered separate entities, this is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer teaches his resolution by using the plural term minor girls, to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different Shabbatot.
בשלמא לרבא – דאמר שבת אי כגופין דמיין אי לא בעיא מיניה היינו דקתני הבא על הקטנות דהיינו גופין מוחלקין:
ומביאים ראיה לצד השני, תא שמע [בוא ושמע] ממה ששנינו בהמשך המשנה, שאמר לו ר׳ אליעזר: הבא על הקטנות יוכיח. בשלמא [נניח] לרבא, היינו דקתני [זהו שהוא שונה] ״קטנות״ בלשון רבים, שכשם שחייב על קטנות בהעלם אחד משום שהן גופים מחולקים — כך חייב בשגגת שבת על כל שבת, משום שגופים מחולקים הן.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid. Granted, according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether Shabbatot are considered separate entities, this is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer teaches his resolution by using the plural term minor girls, to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different Shabbatot.
הכל
(19) אֶלָּא לְרַב חִסְדָּא מַאי קְטַנּוֹת קְטַנּוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.
But according to Rav Ḥisda, who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, what is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term minor girls? The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to minor girls in general, i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.
But according to Rav Ḥisda, who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, what is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term minor girls? The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to minor girls in general, i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.
אלא לרב חסדא – דאמר דימים שבינתים הוויין ידיעה לחלק בעא מיניה:
אמאי קאמר הבא על הקטנות – ליתני הבא על הקטנה חמש ביאות דאית בה ימים שבינתים לחלק כדאמרן:
אין הכי מצי מיתנא ומאי קטנות כל קטנות דעלמא דאם בא על אחת מהן ביאות הרבה חייב על כל אחת ואחת:
אלא לרב חסדא, ששאל אותו לגבי שגגת שבת, האם ימים שבינתיים נחשבים כידיעה לחלק, מאי [מהו] לשון ״קטנות״? ומשיבים: הכוונה היא לקטנות דעלמא [בכלל], כאילו נאמר: הבאים על הקטנות יוכיחו.
But according to Rav Ḥisda, who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, what is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term minor girls? The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to minor girls in general, i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.
הכל
(20) מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּהָדֵין תַּנָּא דְּתַנְיָא א״ר אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר לֹא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ ר׳ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֶלָּא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ הַבָּא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה וְחָזַר וּבָא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה בְּהֶעְלֵם אחת מַהוּ חַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן אוֹ חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
§ The Gemara notes that the mishna, which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the halakhot of a menstruating woman, is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him: In the case of one who unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring only one sin offering for all of the acts of intercourse, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one?
§ The Gemara notes that the mishna, which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the halakhot of a menstruating woman, is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him: In the case of one who unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring only one sin offering for all of the acts of intercourse, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one?
א ומעירים, מתניתין דלא כהדין תנא [משנתנו שלא כשיטתו של תנא זה] היא שנויה. דתניא [ששנויה ברייתא], אמר ר׳ שמעון בן אלעזר: לא כך שאלו ר׳ עקיבא לר׳ אלעזר, כפי ששנינו במשנתנו, ששאל אותו על מלאכות שבת והשיב לו בקל וחומר מן הבא על הנדה, אלא כך שאלו, להיפך: הבא בשגגה על אשתו כשהיתה נדה וחזר ובא על אשתו זו כשהיתה נדה, והיה זה בהעלם אחת, מהו? חייב אחת על כולן, או חייב על כל אחת ואחת?
§ The Gemara notes that the mishna, which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the halakhot of a menstruating woman, is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him: In the case of one who unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring only one sin offering for all of the acts of intercourse, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one?
הכל
(21) אָמַר לֹיה חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר וּמָה שַׁבָּת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַשַּׁבָּת וְהַשַּׁבָּת אֵינָהּ מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת נִדָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְנִדָּה מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: He is liable for each and every one, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited to perform labor on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every prohibited labor; in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited to engage in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited to engage in intercourse with him, is it not right that he should be liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every act of intercourse?
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: He is liable for each and every one, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited to perform labor on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every prohibited labor; in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited to engage in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited to engage in intercourse with him, is it not right that he should be liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every act of intercourse?
אמר ליה [לו] ר׳ אליעזר: חייב על כל אחת ואחת מקל וחומר, ומה שבת שאין בה אלא אזהרה אחת, שהוא מוזהר על השבת והשבת אינה מוזהרת עליו — חייב על כל אחת ואחת מן השבתות, נדה שיש בה שתי אזהרות, שהוא מוזהר על הנדה ונדה מוזהרת עליו — אינו דין שהוא חייב על כל אחת ואחת מן הביאות?
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: He is liable for each and every one, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited to perform labor on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every prohibited labor; in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited to engage in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited to engage in intercourse with him, is it not right that he should be liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every act of intercourse?
הכל
(22) אָמְרוּ לוֹ לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּשַּׁבָּת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה תֹּאמַר בַּנִּדָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple categories of labor that result in liability to bring multiple sin offerings, shall you also say the same in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple transgressions and multiple sin offerings, as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple categories of labor that result in liability to bring multiple sin offerings, shall you also say the same in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple transgressions and multiple sin offerings, as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?
תאמר בנדה – שאין בה תוצאות הרבה ענינין הרבה לא אבות ולא תולדות אלא חיוב ביאה בלבד לא אם אמרת בקטנות נדות שהן גופין מוחלקין תאמר בנדה שהיא גוף אחד:
אמר ליה ר׳ עקיבא: לא, אם אמרת בשבת — שיש בה תוצאות הרבה אבות ותולדות, שמביאות לחטאות הרבה, תאמר בנדה שאין בה תוצאות הרבה לחטאות הרבה, אלא רק חטאת אחת יש בה, על הביאה!
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple categories of labor that result in liability to bring multiple sin offerings, shall you also say the same in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple transgressions and multiple sin offerings, as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?
הכל
(23) אָמְרוּ לוֹ הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who engages in intercourse with five minor menstruating girls will prove it, as with regard to it there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, and yet one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of the girls.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who engages in intercourse with five minor menstruating girls will prove it, as with regard to it there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, and yet one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of the girls.
אמרו לו ר׳ אליעזר: הבא על הקטנות בנידתן יוכיח, שאין בה בקטנה הנדה תוצאות הרבה לחטאות הרבה, וחייב על כל אחת ואחת, אם בא על חמש קטנות בנידתן בהעלם אחד!
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who engages in intercourse with five minor menstruating girls will prove it, as with regard to it there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, and yet one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of the girls.
הכל
(24) אָמְרוּ לוֹ לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּקְּטַנּוֹת שֶׁכֵּן גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין אָמְרוּ לוֹ הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ שֶׁאֵין גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת אָמְרוּ לוֹ הַבְּהֵמָה כַּנִּדָּה.:
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for each one with regard to minors, who are separate entities, shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who copulates with an animal multiple times during a single lapse of awareness will prove that one should be held separately liable for each act, as there are no separate entities, and yet one is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The case of the animal is like the case of the menstruating woman, and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for each one with regard to minors, who are separate entities, shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who copulates with an animal multiple times during a single lapse of awareness will prove that one should be held separately liable for each act, as there are no separate entities, and yet one is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The case of the animal is like the case of the menstruating woman, and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.
א״ל הבא על הבהמה יוכיח – א״ל בהמה הואיל והיא גוף אחד מיבעיא לי כמו נדה אם אינו חייב אלא אחת או על כל אחת ואחת:
סליק פירקא
אמר לו הבא על בהמה יוכיח שאין גופין מוחלקין – וה״ה דמצי למימר נדה יוכיח שהרי ר״א מחייב על כל אחת ואחת אלא שלא שמע מרבותיו נדה רק בהמה לכך נקט ליה.
אמרו לו ר׳ עקיבא: לא, אם אמרת בקטנות שחייב על כל אחת שכן הן גופין מוחלקין, תאמר בבא חמש פעמים על אשתו נדה, שהיא גוף אחד? אמרו לו ר׳ אליעזר: הבא על הבהמה כמה פעמים בהעלם אחד יוכיח, שאין גופין מוחלקין וחייב על כל אחת ואחת! אמרו לו ר׳ עקיבא: הבהמה כנדה, ואף בה יש לומר שאינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for each one with regard to minors, who are separate entities, shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who copulates with an animal multiple times during a single lapse of awareness will prove that one should be held separately liable for each act, as there are no separate entities, and yet one is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The case of the animal is like the case of the menstruating woman, and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.
הכל
(26) מתני׳ מַתְנִיתִין : סָפֵק דאָכַל חֵלֶב סָפֵק לֹא אָכַל וַאֲפִילּוּ אָכַל סָפֵק יֵשׁ בּוֹ כַּשִּׁיעוּר וְסָפֵק
MISHNA: If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty
מתני׳ ספק אכל חלב – מפרש בגמרא מר אמר חתיכה אחת ומר אמר שתי חתיכות.
ואפילו אכל – כגון שסבור שומן הוא ואח״כ נודע לו שהוא אכל חלב אבל ספק יש בו כזית ספק אין בו.
מתני׳ ספק אכל כו׳ – ומיירי בשעה שאכל היה סבור שהוא שומן דאי יודע שהוא ספק חלב היכי מייתי קרבן הא לא שב מידיעתו.
MISHNA: If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty
הכל
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Keritot 17a – William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0), Kishurim Keritot 17a, Ein Mishpat Ner Mitzvah Keritot 17a, Attributed to R. Gershom Keritot 17a, Rashi Keritot 17a, Tosafot Keritot 17a, Steinsaltz Commentary Keritot 17a, Collected Articles Keritot 17a