and it inadvertently got excised, that individual is ritually pure. If he excised it intentionally, in an attempt to render himself ritually pure, the Sages impose a punitive impurity upon him. The tanna’im disagree with regard to the extent of the penalty: Rabbi Eliezer says: When he will develop another leprous mark, his status of ritual purity is assessed based on this new mark. When that mark is ruled ritually pure, he will become ritually pure from the ritual impurity generated by the mark he excised.

And the Rabbis say: The development of a new leprous mark is insufficient. Rather, he must wait either until the leprosy of the new mark spreads over his entire body, a sign of ritual purity (see Leviticus 13:12), or unless his old baheret had shrunk to a size smaller than that of a split bean before he excised it. Otherwise, he remains ritually impure. In any event, it is clear from this mishna that Rabbi Eliezer does not impose an indefinite penalty on one who transgresses. If so, why does he impose an indefinite penalty in the mishna discussing one who causes a blemish on the ear of a firstborn offering?

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say, in answer to this question, that when Rabbi Eliezer penalizes one who transgresses, that is only in a case which involves his property, e.g., a firstborn offering. But in a case which affects his body, e.g., leprosy, he does not penalize him to such an extent.

The Gemara elaborates: With regard to his property, i.e., the firstborn offering, if he would not be penalized indefinitely, there is reason to say that he might come to perform an action which would cause a blemish. Since the firstborn offering is anyway prohibited for personal use until it is blemished, he suffers no risk in blemishing it. A greater deterrent than usual is therefore needed to prevent such action. By contrast, in the case of leprosy on his body, is there a basis to say that he will come to perform an action and remove the white spot? In this case, the limited penalty of having to wait for purification from another leprous mark serves as a sufficient deterrent, as there is no guarantee that another mark will ever appear.

Rava said: Is this to say that the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is difficult in light of the other statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna in Nega’im, whereas the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the other statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im? In the mishna here, the Rabbis impose a limited penalty on the transgressor, whereas in the mishna in Nega’im they impose an indefinite one. This contradiction also requires resolution.

Rather, say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is not difficult in light of the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in Nega’im, as we answered. Likewise, the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im, as both rulings follow the same logic. Here, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did, and there, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did.

The Gemara elaborates: In the case of causing a blemish in a firstborn offering, by what means did he intend to permit it? By means of this blemish. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him only with regard to this blemish, i.e., that the animal will not become permitted to him by means of this blemish that he himself caused. The firstborn offering retains its status as unblemished and will become permitted only if it develops another blemish. And similarly, here, with regard to the removal of the leprous mark, the Rabbis penalize him for what he did. He intended to render himself ritually pure by means of this act of excising the mark. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him with regard to this act of excision. It is considered as though he did not excise the mark, and as a result, he remains impure permanently.

§ The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: When he will develop another leprous mark, he will become ritually pure [yit’har] from the first. Rav Pappa asks: What is the correct version of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? Did we learn: Yit’har, or did we learn: Veyit’har, and he will become ritually pure? Yit’har indicates that he will immediately be rendered ritually pure from the first leprous mark upon the appearance of the second mark. Veyit’har, by contrast, indicates that the punitive ritual impurity by rabbinic law imparted by the first mark remains until the second mark is deemed ritually pure.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two versions? After all, he is in any case ritually impure due to the second mark until that mark is deemed pure. The Gemara explains that there is a difference in the case of a bridegroom who had removed a leprous mark upon whom a new leprous mark appeared during the seven days of his wedding celebrations.

As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 3:2): In the case of a bridegroom upon whom a leprous mark appeared, the court grants him seven days of his wedding celebrations before the mark is examined by a priest. This grace period is granted to him whether the mark appeared on him, i.e., his body, or on his cloak, or on any other garment of his. And similarly, with regard to any individual upon whom a leprous mark appeared during a pilgrimage Festival, the court grants him all the days of the pilgrimage Festival as a grace period, during which the mark is not examined by a priest.

The Gemara continues: If you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is yit’har, i.e., the individual is rendered ritually pure upon the development of the new mark, this means that he is ritually pure during the seven-day period, as he has already become ritually pure of the punitive impurity from the first mark. As for the latter mark, we wait the seven days of feasting for him, before the mark is examined by a priest. He is therefore ritually pure in all regards.

But if you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is veyit’har, and the punitive impurity of the first mark remains intact until the ritual purity of the second mark has been confirmed, the grace period has no effect. The reason is that ultimately, even if the individual does not yet contract ritual impurity from the latter mark, he remains ritually impure on account of the first mark until the purification of the latter mark. The Gemara asks: What is the resolution to Rav Pappa’s query? Since there is no clear resolution, the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna teaches that one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering is prohibited indefinitely from slaughtering the animal on account of that blemish. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In the case of one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering and subsequently dies, what is the halakha with regard to penalizing his son after the father’s death? Does the penalty prohibiting consumption of the firstborn offering extend to the son?

The Gemara compares this dilemma to two similar cases. If you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to gentiles and the seller subsequently dies, where the Sages penalized his son after the father’s death and required him to redeem the slave, this is not a direct parallel. The Gemara explains: It is possible that the penalty is extended to the son only there, as each day that the slave is in the servitude of the gentile master, that master prevents the slave from performing mitzvot. A Canaanite slave is obligated to perform the same mitzvot as a Jewish woman, and he is unable to fulfill the mitzvot when in the possession of a gentile. Since this reason does not apply in a case of a firstborn offering, the case of the Canaanite slave cannot be cited as a source to resolve this dilemma.

And if you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who planned from the outset to perform his labor on the intermediate days of a Festival, by placing himself in a situation in which the labor should in theory be permitted, i.e., that a significant monetary loss would otherwise be incurred, that comparison is also inaccurate. The Gemara elaborates: In such a case the Sages penalized him by deeming it prohibited for him to perform the labor and by removing his rights to any of the finished products, but if he died before the start of the Festival, they did not penalize his son after the father’s death. This case is not a direct parallel either, as it is possible that it is only there that the penalty is not extended to the son, since the father did not yet perform a prohibited act, as he did not carry out any action on the Festival before he died.

If so, here, in the case of mutilating the ear of a firstborn offering, what is the halakha? Should one say that the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, and he is no longer alive? Or perhaps the Sages imposed the penalty upon his property, i.e., that no benefit may be derived from the animal, and that animal still exists in the possession of his heirs.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: You learned the resolution to your dilemma in a mishna (Shevi’it 4:2). A field whose thorns were removed during the Sabbatical Year may be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as removing thorns is not full-fledged labor that renders the field prohibited. But if it had been improved with fertilizer, or if it had been enclosed so that the animals inside would fertilize it with their manure, it may not be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as both these acts cause significant improvements to the field. The Sages imposed a penalty that one may not derive benefit from prohibited labor. And Rav Asi, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: We have a tradition that if one improved his field in a prohibited manner and then died, his son may sow it. Apparently, the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, but the Sages did not penalize his son.