Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.

The Gemara rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.

The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.

The Gemara explains: It is for this very reason that a verse is written to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, to say to you that liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple cannot be derived from the common element shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.

§ The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: “Blood shall be imputed to that man” (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: One who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to bring one sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, one is liable to bring two sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as the verse states with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term “you shall do” in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, the verse has regarded all of the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as one rite with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.

Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who sprinkled the blood of an offering and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael is liable to bring two sin offerings. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as it is for this reason that the verse differentiated between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: “There you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do,” in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.

Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, all agree that he is liable to bring two sin offerings.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: “That slaughters…in the camp,” one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, will be liable, as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, the next part of the verse states: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.

The baraita continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” one might have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering outside all three of the camps. To dispel this notion, the first part of the verse states: “That slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. From where is it derived that one is liable even if he slaughters inside the Levite camp? The verse states: “That slaughters…in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.

If the verse stated only the term “in the camp,” which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, will also be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp.”

This indicates that just as the phrase “outside the camp” is distinctive in that it is referring to an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order or for slaughtering any other type of offering, so too, the term “in the camp” is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This excludes the south of the courtyard, as even though it is an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, it is fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.

Based on this baraita, Ulla says: One who slaughters an offering on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, since the roof is an area that is not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write only: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp,” and it would not be necessary to write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4). Why do I need the verse to also write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”? Is it not to exclude the roof of the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.

The Gemara questions Rava’s claim: But according to Rava, if that is so and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then let the verse write only: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” Why do I need the verse to also write “in the camp” and “outside the camp”? Is it not that the term “in the camp” indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves to include liability for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary? According to this, the term “outside the camp” would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.

Rav Mari said in defense of Rava: No, the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where its body is entirely inside the courtyard but its neck is outside the courtyard.

The Gemara modifies Rav Mari’s statement: If its neck is outside the courtyard, it is obvious that one is liable, as about what is the Merciful One particular? The Merciful One is particular about the slaughter. And in this case, the slaughter is done out-side the courtyard. Rather, say instead that the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering where its body is entirely outside the courtyard but its neck is inside the courtyard.

§ An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard today, when there is no Temple: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it forever. Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Eiduyot 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they would fashion temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever.

The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them for-ever? The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.

§ An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up outside the Temple a limb of an offering and it does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the bone completes the measure to make an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar is not regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar.

Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard